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Table A1: Falsification tests using 2007 as the pseudo proposal year of additional Basel III provisions 
 
This table presents the results for falsification tests using 2007 as the pseudo proposal year of the additional Basel III provisions. Specifically, it presents results 
from estimating Equations [1] and [2]. I examine the effects of Base III on 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 in Columns (1) and (2) and examine the effects of ∆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘T𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 in Columns 
(3) through (10). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 represents the bank × borrower fixed effect, which perfectly subsumes the stand-alone bank fixed 
effect and borrower fixed effect. 𝛼𝑠𝑡 represents the industry × year × quarter (or industry × year) fixed effect. Variables in Columns (1) and (3) are computed at the 
quarterly level, whereas variables in Columns (4) through (10) are at the yearly level. It is worth noting that Column (10) controls for the stand-alone borrower and 
bank fixed effects (rather than bank × borrower fixed effect) due to limited number of observations for banks with R&D expenditures. Standard errors are clustered 
at the bank level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 SprdFee LSize OptV AssetV DTD DEBITM HHI CAPEX IntInv R&D 
Treat*Post 16.715 -0.044* 0.023 0.035* -1.375* 0.001 0.013 0.170** 8.106 0.109*** 
 (1.45) (-1.74) (0.97) (1.81) (-2.12) (0.04) (0.50) (2.10) (0.38) (2.92) 
Treat -3.226 -0.007 -0.016 -0.052** -1.172** 0.066*** 0.004 -0.006 16.149 0.022 
 (-0.34) (-0.82) (-0.90) (-2.64) (-2.35) (4.09) (0.08) (-0.17) (1.47) (0.65) 
LogBankAsset -38.601*** 0.013 -0.009 -0.002 -1.434 0.042 -0.003 -0.119* -1.760 -0.032** 
 (-4.60) (1.48) (-0.50) (-0.10) (-1.20) (1.35) (-0.11) (-1.97) (-0.26) (-2.74) 
LogAsset -23.598*** -0.056*** 0.040*** -0.002 -1.832** 0.008 0.006 -0.261*** 16.316*** -0.174*** 
 (-8.08) (-7.63) (6.53) (-0.21) (-2.76) (0.26) (0.82) (-8.77) (4.97) (-9.88) 
ROA -498.378*** 0.256*** -0.025 -0.047 -1.715 0.210 -0.090* -0.665*** -5.701 0.317** 
 (-4.19) (3.32) (-0.13) (-0.91) (-0.71) (1.28) (-1.98) (-4.04) (-0.14) (2.68) 
Leverage 99.675*** 0.004 -0.024 0.098** -2.644*** 0.150 -0.007 0.285** 8.762 -0.006 
 (4.42) (0.24) (-1.05) (2.38) (-3.83) (1.26) (-0.20) (2.67) (0.38) (-0.11) 
LogMaturity -0.182 0.017***         
 (-0.08) (8.42)         
LoanType 46.465*** -0.005         
 (16.28) (-0.85)         
PriorRel -4.425 -0.064*         
 (-0.14) (-1.80)         
Borrower FE / / / / / / / / / Yes 
Bank × Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes / 
Industry × Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes / / / / / / / 
Industry × Year FE / / / Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,447 8,447 3,035 2,859 2,295 1,631 3,502 4,149 2,982 1,840 




Table A2: Falsification tests using 2014 as the pseudo proposal year of additional Basel III provisions 
 
This table presents the results for falsification tests using 2014 as the pseudo proposal year of the additional Basel III provisions. Specifically, it presents results 
from estimating Equations [1] and [2]. I examine the effects of Base III on 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 in Columns (1) and (2) and examine the effects of ∆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘T𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 in Columns 
(3) through (10). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 represents the bank × borrower fixed effect, which perfectly subsumes the stand-alone bank fixed 
effect and borrower fixed effect. 𝛼𝑠𝑡 represents the industry × year × quarter (or industry × year) fixed effect. Variables in Columns (1) and (3) are computed at the 
quarterly level, whereas variables in Columns (4) through (10) are at the yearly level. It is worth noting that Column (10) controls for the stand-alone borrower and 
bank fixed effects (rather than bank × borrower fixed effect) due to limited number of observations for banks with R&D expenditures. Standard errors are clustered 
at the bank level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 SprdFee LSize OptV AssetV DTD DEBITM HHI CAPEX IntInv R&D 
Treat*Post -4.930 -0.013* 0.023 0.009 -0.883* 0.036* 0.007 0.074 9.518 0.031 
 (-0.64) (-1.72) (1.68) (0.53) (-1.93) (1.96) (0.34) (1.36) (1.20) (0.67) 
Treat 2.323 0.002 -0.049*** -0.060** -0.784 -0.015 0.006 -0.017 14.841** -0.043 
 (0.29) (0.19) (-3.87) (-2.32) (-1.05) (-1.25) (0.12) (-0.28) (2.14) (-1.12) 
LogBankAsset -36.685*** -0.004 0.013 0.031 -2.123** 0.059** -0.003 -0.030 -0.322 0.001 
 (-4.72) (-0.29) (0.97) (1.14) (-2.68) (2.20) (-0.18) (-0.73) (-0.02) (0.08) 
LogAsset -22.333*** -0.055*** 0.037*** 0.001 -1.877** 0.007 -0.001 -0.319*** 11.033*** -0.180*** 
 (-5.78) (-10.67) (9.57) (0.10) (-2.91) (0.27) (-0.17) (-9.13) (5.62) (-15.25) 
ROA -486.620*** 0.250*** 0.154 -0.073* -2.398 0.253 -0.106** -0.781*** -7.314 -0.056 
 (-4.02) (3.63) (1.34) (-1.91) (-1.25) (1.16) (-2.30) (-4.65) (-0.17) (-0.71) 
Leverage 91.940*** -0.001 0.002 0.132*** -2.506** 0.150 0.033 0.191** -1.998 -0.019 
 (7.15) (-0.04) (0.19) (6.38) (-2.93) (0.98) (0.92) (2.43) (-0.12) (-0.22) 
LogMaturity -1.099 0.018***         
 (-0.47) (9.69)         
LoanType 46.985*** -0.004         
 (18.32) (-0.72)         
PriorRel 122.533** -0.014         
 (2.28) (-0.26)         
Borrower FE / / / / / / / / / Yes 
Bank × Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes / 
Industry × Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes / / / / / / / 
Industry × Year FE / / / Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,517 8,517 2,993 2,941 2,438 1,624 3,495 4,006 2,958 1,853 




Table A3: Falsification tests using $150 billion as the pseudo asset-size cutoff for additional Basel III provisions 
 
This table presents the results for falsification tests using $150 billion as the pseudo asset-size cutoff for additional Basel III provisions. Specifically, it presents 
results from estimating Equations [1] and [2]. I examine the effects of Base III on 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 in Columns (1) and (2) and examine the effects of ∆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘T𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 in 
Columns (3) through (10). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 represents the bank × borrower fixed effect, which perfectly subsumes the stand-alone bank 
fixed effect and borrower fixed effect. 𝛼𝑠𝑡 represents the industry × year × quarter (or industry × year) fixed effect. Variables in Columns (1) and (3) are computed 
at the quarterly level, whereas variables in Columns (4) through (10) are at the yearly level. It is worth noting that Column (10) controls for the stand-alone borrower 
and bank fixed effects (rather than bank × borrower fixed effect) due to limited number of observations for banks with R&D expenditures. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 SprdFee LSize OptV AssetV DTD DEBITM HHI CAPEX IntInv R&D 
Treat*Post 15.487* -0.015 0.019 0.030* -1.016** 0.006 0.045 0.132** -0.717 0.069* 
 (1.89) (-1.68) (1.05) (1.99) (-2.79) (0.21) (1.61) (2.81) (-0.08) (1.96) 
Treat 0.711 0.025* -0.003 -0.072*** -0.206 0.036*** 0.011 -0.032 -13.366 -0.036 
 (0.08) (2.01) (-0.26) (-3.73) (-0.36) (3.79) (0.57) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-1.42) 
LogBankAsset -35.825*** -0.009 0.004 0.018 -2.519** 0.070*** -0.005 -0.047 0.795 -0.001 
 (-4.06) (-0.60) (0.28) (0.70) (-2.68) (3.57) (-0.37) (-1.06) (0.06) (-0.05) 
LogAsset -25.035*** -0.055*** 0.042*** -0.001 -1.731** 0.026 0.001 -0.284*** 15.950*** -0.170*** 
 (-6.04) (-9.14) (10.52) (-0.09) (-2.76) (0.75) (0.16) (-9.26) (6.21) (-10.36) 
ROA -515.584*** 0.223*** 0.086 -0.081 -1.575 0.308 -0.080** -0.734*** -3.159 0.064 
 (-4.31) (3.64) (0.73) (-1.73) (-0.76) (1.36) (-2.26) (-5.12) (-0.06) (0.58) 
Leverage 91.978*** 0.011 -0.017 0.105*** -2.173** 0.202 0.014 0.199** 4.409 -0.040 
 (6.24) (0.68) (-1.24) (3.31) (-2.89) (1.68) (0.38) (2.10) (0.21) (-0.57) 
LogMaturity -2.462 0.019***         
 (-0.94) (8.01)         
LoanType 47.012*** -0.006         
 (15.85) (-1.01)         
PriorRel 19.133 -0.051         
 (0.45) (-0.98)         
Borrower FE / / / / / / / / / Yes 
Bank × Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes / 
Industry × Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes / / / / / / / 
Industry × Year FE / / / Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,906 8,906 3,144 3,099 2,528 1,725 3,641 4,293 3,097 1,931 




Table A4: Falsification tests using $450 billion as the pseudo asset-size cutoff for additional Basel III provisions 
 
This table presents the results for falsification tests using $450 billion as the pseudo asset-size cutoff for additional Basel III provisions. Specifically, it presents 
results from estimating Equations [1] and [2]. I examine the effects of Base III on 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 in Columns (1) and (2) and examine the effects of ∆𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘T𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 in 
Columns (3) through (10). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 represents the bank × borrower fixed effect, which perfectly subsumes the stand-alone bank 
fixed effect and borrower fixed effect. 𝛼𝑠𝑡 represents the industry × year × quarter (or industry × year) fixed effect. Variables in Columns (1) and (3) are computed 
at the quarterly level, whereas variables in Columns (4) through (10) are at the yearly level. It is worth noting that Column (10) controls for the stand-alone borrower 
and bank fixed effects (rather than bank × borrower fixed effect) due to limited number of observations for banks with R&D expenditures. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 SprdFee LSize OptV AssetV DTD DEBITM HHI CAPEX IntInv R&D 
Treat*Post 8.714 -0.012** 0.031*** 0.016 -0.442 0.040* 0.023 0.092* 12.972*** 0.024 
 (1.22) (-2.29) (3.22) (1.03) (-0.63) (1.87) (1.31) (1.81) (3.00) (0.56) 
Treat -32.885** 0.025* -0.021 0.011 0.934 -0.033 -0.002 -0.024 -10.157 -0.016 
 (-2.22) (2.02) (-1.00) (0.47) (1.54) (-1.09) (-0.26) (-0.73) (-1.46) (-0.47) 
LogBankAsset -29.407*** -0.013 0.007 0.003 -2.693** 0.076*** -0.001 -0.039 -2.187 -0.001 
 (-4.52) (-1.13) (0.44) (0.19) (-2.92) (3.37) (-0.03) (-0.95) (-0.17) (-0.03) 
LogAsset -24.233*** -0.055*** 0.043*** -0.002 -1.756** 0.029 0.001 -0.282*** 16.471*** -0.170*** 
 (-6.76) (-9.51) (10.59) (-0.19) (-2.78) (0.84) (0.27) (-9.40) (6.45) (-10.18) 
ROA -518.781*** 0.223*** 0.084 -0.080 -1.630 0.310 -0.081** -0.736*** -2.132 0.068 
 (-4.30) (3.68) (0.70) (-1.71) (-0.79) (1.38) (-2.26) (-5.08) (-0.04) (0.63) 
Leverage 91.210*** 0.011 -0.019 0.108*** -2.162** 0.199 0.015 0.198* 3.269 -0.040 
 (6.06) (0.72) (-1.38) (3.36) (-2.86) (1.67) (0.40) (2.07) (0.15) (-0.56) 
LogMaturity -2.410 0.019***         
 (-0.91) (8.00)         
LoanType 46.945*** -0.006         
 (16.19) (-0.99)         
PriorRel 23.728 -0.055         
 (0.56) (-1.05)         
Borrower FE / / / / / / / / / Yes 
Bank × Borrower FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes / 
Industry × Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes / / / / / / / 
Industry × Year FE / / / Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,906 8,906 3,144 3,099 2,528 1,725 3,641 4,293 3,097 1,931 
Adj. R-Square 0.682 0.460 0.748 0.580 0.444 0.245 0.285 0.263 0.148 0.244 
 
